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ABSTRACT 
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (hereinafter NOTA) was an 
attempt to regulate, streamline, and encourage legal organ donation. NOTA 
has undergone some amendments since its enactment, including attempts to 
modernize the registry process and create a unified donation and transplant 
network. However, the regulation on the sale of organs has remained 
steadfast. We continue to have an organ shortage, and the statistics on the 
number of individuals dying each day awaiting transplants is only getting 
worse. An additional amendment to NOTA is necessary to solve our organ 
donation crisis. This Article identifies the relevant NOTA provisions, 
identifies some significant court decisions, and explores the policy and 
economic arguments in support of and against creating a living organ trade 
in the United States. In addition, this Article explains the Iranian Living-
Unrelated donor program, and the government regulations necessary to 
create a living kidney vendor program in the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is your kidney for sale? Should you be able to sell it? Should our country 
consider a living kidney organ vendor program to relive our growing organ 
shortage? The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (hereinafter NOTA)1 
was an attempt to regulate, streamline and encourage legal organ donation. It 
has undergone some amendments in the intervening years, including attempts 
to streamline the registry process, and to create a unified donation and 
transplant network.2 However, the regulation on the sale of organs has 
remained steadfast. Fast forward 32+ years and we continue to have an organ 
shortage, and the statistics on the number of individuals dying each day 
awaiting transplants are only getting worse. An amendment to NOTA is 
necessary to solve our organ donation crisis. There is a strong economic 
argument that creating a fully regulated, Living-Unrelated Donor Program 
would not only solve the organ shortage, but also provide a sustainable 
market that would benefit organ donors in addition to their recipients. A 
regulated free market has the potential, in theory, to increase the number of 
living kidney donors while resulting in overall greater economic efficiency. 
We have a ready supply of viable kidneys, and a desperate demand for them. 
The law is standing in the way of the market controlling this relationship, and 
providing an efficient outcome. 
II. DONATION STATISTICS 
Every day in the United States, 20 to 30 people die waiting for an organ 
donation.3 There are more than 119,000 men, women, and children on the 
national transplant waiting list, and more than 80% of transplant candidates 
are waiting for the donation of a kidney.4 In 2015, a total of 37,910 organs 
were donated, however, more than 80% of the donations were from deceased 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–276 (2013). 
2 Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1988); 
Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-144, § 2, 121 Stat. 1813 (2007) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 273b, 274e and 301 (2007)). 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Organ Donation Statistics: Why be an Organ Donor, 
https://organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html. 
4 Id. 
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donors.5 Further, only 3 in every 1,000 people die in such a way as to make 
them eligible for organ donation, and only 48% of adults in the United States 
are currently signed up as donors.6 Finally, this problem is not resolving 
itself. Each year, the number of people on the waiting list continues to grow, 
while the number of donors grows slowly. In fact, the number of people on 
the organ donation waitlist has more than quadrupled in the last 22 years, 
while the number of organ donors has remained relatively constant.7 In 
economic terms, the current system does not adequately incentivize the 
market to adjust supply to demand. This situation is only going to get worse 
as medical technology, combined with our country’s aging population, 
results in citizens living longer, which creates an increase in the demand for 
transplant organs. Although living donors are an important source of kidneys, 
living donation rates are not increasing at a level to satisfy demand. 
III. HISTORY OF NOTA 
The debate over the buying and selling of organs became a national issue 
in 1983 when H. Barry Jacobs, a Virginia physician, formed an organization, 
the International Kidney Exchange, to purchase and market kidneys.8 Under 
Dr. Jacob’s proposal, a living donor would set a price for their kidney, up to 
$10,000, and the recipient would pay that fee, along with a broker 
commission, for the kidney.9 It was recognized by Dr. Jacobs that some of 
the kidneys purchased would be from people living in underdeveloped 
countries.10 The medical community and legislators were disturbed by 
Dr. Jacob’s proposal.11 The National Kidney Foundation stated that it was 
“immoral and unethical . . . to place a living person at risk of surgical 
complication and even death for a cash payment to that person.”12 As there 
appeared to be no legal method to prevent Dr. Jacob’s from buying, 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Gwen Mayes, Buying and Selling of Organs for Transplantation in the United States, MEDSCAPE 
(Dec. 9, 2003), https://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/465200. 
9 Id. 
10 Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1983), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1983/09/24/us/buying-of-kidneys-of-poor-attacked.html. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
2018] IS YOUR KIDNEY FOR SALE? 135 
 
Vol. 36, No. 2 (2018) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2018.140 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
importing, and selling human organs in 1983, legislators responded 
quickly.13 Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative Albert Gore, Jr. 
each proposed legislation that would both establish a national system for 
organ procurement, and outlaw the unregulated sale of organs.14 The 
provisions of these bills became what we now know as NOTA, which 
regulates organ donation.15 
IV. PROHIBITION ON ORGAN PURCHASES IN NOTA 
Section 301 of NOTA, entitled “Prohibition of organ purchases,” 
imposes criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and 5 years in prison on any 
person who “knowingly acquire[s], receive[s], or otherwise transfer[s] any 
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if 
the transfer affects interstate commerce.”16 Section 301 does not define 
“valuable consideration,” but instead lists certain acts that do not involve 
“valuable consideration.”17 According to Section 301, “valuable 
consideration” does not include the “reasonable payments associated with the 
removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality 
control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and 
lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the 
donation of the organ.”18 The legislative history of NOTA does not define 
“valuable consideration” either, but rather only references the “buying and 
selling” of human organs.19 The Senate Report indicates that the bill 
“prohibits the interstate buying and selling of human organs for 
transplantation” and “is directed at preventing the for-profit marketing of 
kidneys and other organs.”20 It further indicates that “individuals or 
organizations should not profit by the sale of human organs,” and that 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 Id. 
14 National Organ Transplant Act, S. 2018, 98th Cong. (1983), https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/98/s2018; National Organ Transplant Act, H.R. 4080, 98th Cong. (1983), https:// 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/98/hr4080. 
15 National Organ Transplant Act, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 264e (2016). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2016). 
18 Id. 
19 Memorandum Op. from the Gen. Counsel Dep’t of Health and Human Services (Mar. 28, 2007) 
(on file with author). 
20 S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2, 4 (1986), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976, 3978. 
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“human body parts should not be viewed as commodities.”21 The House 
Conference Report on NOTA also notes that the bill “intends to make the 
buying and selling of human organs unlawful.”22 Although there is a lack of 
specific guidance on what constitutes “valuable consideration,” 
commentators have largely concluded that payment for an organ violates 
NOTA. Despite NOTA outlawing the buying and selling of organs, it was 
not until 2011 that the first organ traffic case was prosecuted in the United 
States.23 In United States v. Rosenbaum, a New York man was charged with 
brokering black market sales of human kidneys to three Americans in 
violation of NOTA.24 In a case of first impression, Rosenbaum, an Israeli 
citizen, pled guilty to three counts of organ trafficking and one count of 
conspiracy.25 
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS TO YOUR KIDNEY 
If you ask the average American if they own their organs, the answer 
would be yes. A notion that we do not own the organs within our body does 
not seem to make sense. However, under NOTA you do not enjoy all of the 
typical property characteristics of your organs. The characteristics of 
property include the right to possess, use, exclude others from use, and 
transfer. Private property includes this “bundle of rights.” Here is the 
challenge with respect to your organs: Although they may remain your 
exclusive property and cannot be taken without your consent, you also do not 
have the right to transfer your organs at will. Rather, under NOTA the legal 
transfer of our organs, either through living donation or upon our death, is to 
a centralized organization that decides who will receive those organs. 
Organ donations go to the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network 
(hereinafter OPTN). OPTN, which developed out of NOTA, establishes a 
national organ sharing system to guarantee, among other things, fairness in 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Id. at 16017, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3982. 
22 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992. 
23 David Glovin, Kidney Broker Pleads Guilty in First U.S. Organ-Traffic Case, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 27, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-27/kidney-broker-pleads-guilty-in-
first-u-s-organ-trafficking-prosecution. 
24 United States v. Rosenbaum, Mag. No. 09-3620 (D.N.J. 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/Rosenbaum%20Complaint.pdf. 
25 Id. 
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the allocation of organs for transplant.26 OPTN maintains a database of all 
patients waiting for various organ transplants.27 Further, OPTN allocates the 
distribution of organs based on a balancing of factors.28 OPTN balances 
“justice (fair consideration of candidates’ circumstances and medical needs), 
and medical utility (trying to increase the number of transplants performed 
and the length of time patients and organs survive).”29 As a result, you 
transfer property rights in your organs, or the organs of your deceased family 
member, to OPTN for distribution.30 Therefore, OPTN owns the “bundle of 
rights” in the donated organs.31 
Under common law, there is no clear property right in a human corpse, 
and therefore no one has the right to transfer a cadaver or any of its parts for 
any purpose, including as a gift.32 In the case of deceased family members, 
courts have acknowledged that relatives have a “possessory interest” that 
only exists long enough to allow them to bury or otherwise dispose of their 
family member’s body.33 Judicial interpretations of this interest in the 
cadaver evolved in the 19th century, paralleling the rise in demand for human 
cadavers in medical science, and the use of cremation as an alternative to 
burial.34 It was in these earlier cases that courts began to recognize that the 
next of kin had the right to possess and control the disposition of the bodies 
of their dead relatives.35 However, these cases only created “a quasi property 
right, belonging to the spouse or next of kin to possess the body for the 
purposes of ensuring proper burial,”36 and did not create any other property 
rights to the human corpse. 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network—History, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/about-the-optn/history-nota/. 
27 Id. 
28 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network—How Organ Allocation Works, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/how-organ-
allocation-works/. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See In re Estate of Johnson, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81 (N.Y. Surr. 11, 1938). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 85–86 (describing “an outpouring” of such cases). 
35 Id. 
36 Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244 (2005). See, e.g., Bauer 
v. North Fulton Med. Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240, 243–44 (1999) (The quasi-property right in a corpse 
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VI. SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS 
In recent decisions, courts have maintained the same theory that body 
parts are not property, either living or cadaver, which have a “bundle of 
rights” that can be transferred.37 In Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California, the California Supreme Court addressed whether a patient has a 
possessory interest in a patented cell line that was developed from his blood 
and cells.38 In the Moore case, the patient’s blood and cells were extracted 
for therapeutic purposes to treat his leukemia.39 However, at the same time, 
his physicians were researching and developing a new cell line.40 Moore 
alleged that his physicians failed to disclose the preexisting research and 
economic interests in the cells before obtaining consent to the medical 
procedures by which they were extracted.41 The physicians subsequently 
used these cells to create a commercially-patented cell line and various 
methods for using the cell line to produce lymphokines.42 Moore theorized 
that he “continued to own his cells following their removal from his body, at 
least for the purpose of directing their use, and that he never consented to 
their use in potentially-lucrative medical research.”43 Moore argued that the 
physicians engaged in conversion by using his cells.44 The court rejected this 
notion and refused to extend full property interest to Moore of the resulting 
ownership in his cells.45 
Courts have continued to avoid answering the question as to what extent 
we have property interests in our body, and have come to markedly different 
                                                                                                                           
 
encompasses only the power to ensure that the corpse is orderly handled and laid to rest, nothing more.); 
Dick v. City of New York, 2002 WL 31844745, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002). 
37 See, e.g., Shults v. United States, 995 F. Supp. 1270, 1275–76 (D. Kan. 1998) (Parents of 
deceased airman had no claim for conversion where portions of son’s tissues and organs were discarded 
after autopsy.); Hasselbach v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 159 N.Y.S. 376, 377–79 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916) (Widow 
could not sustain conversion claim for unauthorized autopsy performed on husband.). 
38 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1990). 
39 Id. at 480. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Cf. Lymphokines, THEFREEDICTIONARY.com (2003), http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary 
.com/lymphokine (Lymphokines regulate immune responses and can be used for the treatment of cancer.). 
43 Moore, 793 P.2d at 482. 
44 Id. (Conversion is a tort that protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests 
in personal property.). 
45 Id. at 493–97. 
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results depending on what body part they are evaluating. In Davis v. Davis, 
the court was asked to determine the relative interests between two divorcing 
spouses in the disposition of seven frozen embryos produced through in-vitro 
fertilization.46 The court evaluated the nature of the embryos, which were 
formed by using the wife’s ova and the husband’s sperm, and whether they 
were “personal property” of either of the spouses. The court determined that 
the embryos were neither “persons” nor “property,” but rather “occupy an 
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential 
for human life.”47 In Hecht v. Superior Court of California, the court was 
asked to determine whether there is a “testamentary interest” in sperm 
deposited in a sperm bank.48 In Hecht, William Kane, the decedent, gave his 
deposited sperm to his mistress for her use “should she so desire.”49 Kane’s 
family contested his will, and the court found that at the time the sperm 
donation was made, Kane did have a “testamentary interest” in his sperm, 
and therefore it was property subject to disposition in the estate.50 
The court cases on the ownership of our body, more specifically our 
organs, do not provide specific guidance to facilitate a discussion on the 
extent of property interests in human organs. In one important case, the court 
addressed the question of whether we even own our organs when we die. In 
2006, the New York Court of Appeals, in Colavito v. New York Organ Donor 
Network, Inc., considered the ability of our relatives to decide on the 
disposition of our organs upon our death, and whether those organs are 
property that can be transferred to another person.51 In August 2002, Peter 
Lucia died of intra-cranial bleeding in a Long Island, New York hospital.52 
His widow, Debra Lucia, decided to donate his kidneys.53 One of them she 
specifically donated to Peter’s long-time friend, Robert Colavito, who was 
suffering from end-stage renal disease. Peter Lucia’s left kidney was sent to 
a hospital in Miami, Florida, where Colavito was waiting for its 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
47 Id. at 597. 
48 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
49 Id. at 276. 
50 Id. at 289. 
51 Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.E.2d 43, 44-5 (N.Y. 2006). 
52 Id. at 44. 
53 Id. at 45. 
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implantation.54 Lucia’s right kidney stayed in New York.55 During the 
process of preparing Colavito for surgery, doctors discovered that Lucia’s 
left kidney was damaged and unfit for implantation.56 When the Florida 
hospital called the New York Organ Donor Network (“NYODN”) to ask for 
delivery of the second kidney for implantation into Colavito, they were told 
that it had already been delivered to and implanted in another patient.57 
Colavito filed suit, asserting causes of action sounding in fraud, conversion, 
and violation of the New York Public Health Law.58 Essentially, he argued 
that he had a property interest in the kidney that was transferred to him upon 
Peter Lucia’s death by Debra Lucia, and that the NYODN had violated that 
property interest. He asserted that as the specified donee of the organs, he 
acquired a property right in both kidneys, giving rise to claims against the 
defendants for delivering the right kidney to someone else.59 Debra Lucia 
testified in an earlier proceeding that had she known that the kidneys could 
not be used by Colavito, she would not have consented to their removal.60 
According to Lucia, “there was no question about them being transplantable. 
[Colavito’s blood] was a universal blood type, and therefore, he was 
compatible. Had [the physician] told me any other thing, I would not have 
donated them.”61 Although the lower court found that it is “arguable that . . . 
a person or entity may have an enforceable property right in a functioning 
organ,” the New York Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the 
plaintiff, “as a specified donee of an incompatible kidney, had no common-
law right to the organ,” and his “cause of action for conversion must fail, as 
it is necessarily based on his claimed right to possess the kidney in 
question.”62 
In another important case, the court addressed whether individuals can 
be compensated for bone marrow donations. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, in Flynn v. Holder, specifically ruled on whether NOTA could 
                                                                                                                           
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 46. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 47. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2006). 
62 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006). 
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prohibit compensation for “bone marrow” donations.63 The program in 
question in Flynn offered $3000 awards in the form of scholarships, housing 
allowances, or gifts to charities selected by donors, in exchange for the 
donation of bone marrow.64 In Flynn, the plaintiffs argued that NOTA, as 
applied to a bone marrow pilot program, violated the Equal Protection 
clause.65 NOTA specifically defines a “human organ” as including the human 
kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and 
skin, and any other human organ specified by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services by regulation.66 The plaintiffs claimed that “blood stem cell 
harvesting is not materially different from blood, sperm, or egg harvesting, 
which are not included under the statutory or regulatory definitions of 
‘human organ.’”67 The government argued that since it is “much harder to 
find a match for patients who need bone marrow transplants than for patients 
that need blood transfusions, exploitative market forces could be triggered if 
bone marrow could be bought.”68 The Flynn court focused on the advanced 
technology being used to extract the bone marrow, and found that with this 
new and less invasive procedure, only some of the marrow’s “hematopoietic 
stem cells” were being extracted, and not the “soft, fatty substance in the 
bone cavities.”69 In making this distinction, the court was comparing the bone 
marrow extracted through this new process with the extraction of blood and 
blood products, which is not covered by NOTA. Therefore, the court 
concluded that this new procedure did not fall under the prohibitions on organ 
donation in NOTA and that the criminalization for provisions of NOTA did 
not apply to the pilot program at issue.70 
The court’s conclusion in Flynn sparked further controversy as to why 
individuals can be paid for blood, blood products, sperm, egg donation, and 
now bone marrow, but not for other organs.71 Some advocates of legalizing 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012). 
64 684 F.3d at 858. 
65 Id. 
66 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2012). 
67 684 F.3d at 858. 
68 Id. at 859. 
69 Id. at 863. 
70 Id. at 865. 
71 Adam Cohen, Should You Be Allowed to Sell Your Bone Marrow: A new ruling reinterprets the 
National Organ Transplant Act banning the sale of bone marrow. Will other human body parts follow?, 
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organ donation hailed the Flynn decision as having “broad implications for 
transplant policy in general because it underscores the profound weakness in 
our altruism-only transplant policy.”72 Further, commentators argue that this 
simple compensation will expand the donor pool for bone marrow.73 
Specifically, Carol Williams argues that “this is a fundamental change to how 
deadly blood disease will be treated in the country,” and “compensation will 
expand the donor pool by at least hundreds and potentially thousands each 
year.”74 However, this raises the question of why the same rationale cannot 
be expanded to include the donation of a kidney. Although NOTA 
specifically lists kidneys as an organ that cannot be traded for valuable 
consideration, with the advances in kidney transplantation and the 
advancements in understanding the human body, is not the donation of a 
kidney, one of two duplicative organs, more akin to the donation of bone 
marrow than the donation of a lung? Further, was not the Flynn court also 
responding to the lack of supply of bone marrow, coupled with the new less-
invasive technology to harvest that bone marrow, in making their decision? 
Does that same rationale apply to kidney donation? 
VII. MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF ORGANS 
Interestingly, two different practices have developed in the United 
States that sidestep the restrictions of NOTA. These practices effectively 
allow a recipient to bypass or “move-up” on the national waiting list to 
receive a kidney from a deceased donor. Living donor transplants have 
always been legal under NOTA.75 Typically, this occurs when a related or 
otherwise connected individual volunteers to donate a kidney to the recipient. 
Issues arise when the would-be donor is incompatible with the recipient, and 
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therefore a direct donation cannot occur. A Paired Exchange, however, 
occurs when a living donor is incompatible with the recipient, so the donor 
exchanges an organ with another donor/recipient pair. There have been a 
number of reported successful transplants involving Paired Exchanges.76 One 
such exchange involved five transplant candidates, all former strangers from 
across the country.77 This swap, which included simultaneous marathon 
operations, was made possible when four transplant candidates each had a 
living relative willing to donate a kidney, and a fifth candidate was on the 
national waiting list. Although none of the related pairs were compatible, the 
donors were compatible with someone else in the larger five pair group, and 
as a result, the five-way swap was organized.78 A Paired Exchange can be a 
creative way to allow for living donor exchanges of organs. An additional 
alternative practice is usually referred to as a Living Donor/Deceased Donor 
(“LDDD”) Exchange. In this scenario, the donor wants to donate a kidney, 
but a paired exchange is not possible because he or she is not a suitable match 
for the intended recipient. Instead, the donor can offer to donate a kidney to 
a stranger on the waiting list, in exchange for the intended recipient 
advancing on the waiting list for another kidney from another source. This 
allows the intended recipient to receive a kidney much sooner than had they 
waited under the typical waiting procedure. 
Taking into consideration the organ exchange techniques listed above, 
it is important to consider whether these practices violate the “valuable 
consideration” prong of NOTA. All of the donors involved in these 
exchanges received a benefit for their donation: they provide a life-saving 
organ to a system, that in turn provides a life-saving organ to the donor’s 
intended recipient, often a relative or loved one. Unfortunately, there is little 
legislative history to define “valuable consideration.” However, there is no 
indication that any of the legislative drafters intended to define “valuable 
consideration” as anything other than direct monetary compensation for an 
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organ.79 Further, the Department of Health and Human Services concluded 
that both of these “donative practices” do not imply “valuable consideration” 
under NOTA, and therefore do not implicate the criminal penalties of the 
statute.80 As a result, the current system does not consider these exchange 
programs violative of the “valuable consideration” prohibitions of NOTA. 
However, one could argue that these exchange programs are, in essence, 
doing the same thing as a Living-Unrelated Donation program, with the use 
of a bartering system by exchanging the property rights to kidneys in lieu of 
monetary compensation. Does it make sense to make this distinction? 
VIII. WHY SHOULD KIDNEYS BE THE EXCEPTION TO NOTA? 
Kidneys should be the exception to NOTA because of the biological 
realities of the kidney. Most humans are born with two kidneys that are part 
of their renal system.81 The renal system also includes the uterus, bladder, 
and urethra.82 Kidneys have many functions, including regulating blood 
pressure, producing red blood cells, activating vitamin D, and producing 
glucose.83 In addition, the kidneys filter bodily fluids through the 
bloodstream, produce waste (excreted as urine), and maintain the 
composition, pH, and osmotic pressure of our bodily fluids.84 Distinct from 
our other organs, most humans are born with more kidneys than they need. 
In fact, a single kidney, functioning at only 75% capacity, can provide all that 
a human renal system requires.85 Further, if an individual only has one 
kidney, it can adjust to filter just as much as two kidneys.86 In addition, if you 
are only born with one kidney, the other kidney can grow to reach a size 
similar to the combined weight of two kidneys (about one pound). In this 
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way, the existence of a second kidney is really a “biological insurance 
policy.” Individuals should be allowed to transfer this insurance policy just 
as they are able to transfer other pieces of personal property. 
IX. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST A LIVING ORGAN TRADE 
There are a number of policy arguments for why a living organ trade, or 
the ability to compensate living (or the family of deceased) donors for their 
organ donations, is a dangerous practice. Three main policy arguments are: 
(1) an organized organ trade will exploit the poor; (2) there are intangible 
consequences to an organ trade; and (3) an organ trade will encourage 
corruption. 
A. An Organ Market Exploits the Poor 
One of the most compelling arguments against an organ trade is that the 
vulnerability of poor populations makes them particularly susceptible to 
exploitation, because the poor will be attracted to the idea of selling their 
kidneys for a profit. The same incentive does not exist for the wealthy. The 
resulting situation could therefore become a mismatch between 
predominantly poor donors and largely wealthy recipients, a situation rife for 
exploitation. This policy argument has been borne out by the data from Iran,87 
Pakistan, and India, where the majority of organ donors are extremely poor.88 
The concern is that the current economic divide will be further expanded with 
the addition of organ transplantation in the economy. 
Although a rational concern, this is something that can be overcome 
with regulation; free-market approaches tend to trade equity for efficiency. 
Further, this simplistic argument does not address economic realities. Does 
the fact that organ suppliers will be economically disadvantaged prohibit a 
market for organs? In a true market for organs, where the individuals selling 
their organs are doing so voluntarily and are not forced into the sale, do we 
have a right as a society to limit their ability to engage in that exchange? If a 
person is not going to benefit by the transaction, then the rules of a free 
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market economy will not allow the transaction to occur. The notion that the 
economically disadvantaged will be taken advantage of robs them of the 
choice to make the decision on their own. 
There are currently other markets where the economically 
disadvantaged are exploited. Consider some risky employment options, such 
as coal mining or enlisting in the military. In these instances, society has 
determined that we are willing to accept the potentially large personal costs 
to provide a larger social benefit. We do not restrict the performance of those 
jobs because there is a potential to prey on the economically disadvantaged. 
In this respect, as a society, we weigh the social benefit against the social 
cost for many issues. If we consider the social benefit of an open market for 
kidneys to be worth at least 20 to 30 lives that could be saved every day, is it 
worth the risk? 
Finally, by restricting the ability of the poor to sell their organs, society 
is likewise restricting them to their current economic situation. Studies of 
paid donors in overseas markets indicate that the majority of those donors 
use the money to relieve themselves of debt, or buy food or clothing.89 If the 
market for a kidney could change the economic situation for an individual or 
a family, is there a societal benefit in restricting that right? 
B. The Organ Market Ignores Intangible Costs to the Donor 
Another concern regarding a living organ trade is that the long-term 
health consequences of organ donation will not be considered by the donor 
that is looking to “cash-in” on organ donation. The obvious cost to the living 
donor is the risk that comes with any major surgical procedure, such as the 
risk of surgical complications and/or death. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that living kidney donors do not usually develop significant long-
term detrimental health effects. Rather, the more common situation involves 
rare instances of surgical complications, not the lack of the kidney.90 
Moreover, there is a lack of clinical research on the long-term consequences 
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of living organ donation.91 Some reports of mortality associated with living 
liver donation have affected the perception of the risk of living organ 
donation.92 In addition, some surveys of living donors in India have reported 
adverse health effects.93 In India, where there is no regulation of the organ 
market, about 86% of donors reported deterioration in their health status.94 
However, due to the lack of regulation in India, there is a substantial concern 
that these procedures are performed in back-street clinics with incomplete 
donor and recipient evaluation, and inadequate pre-operative and post-
operative care.95 As a result, it is necessary to remember that the standard of 
healthcare in these countries, especially with reference to the unregulated 
black market sale of organs, is difficult to compare with the state of modern 
medicine in the United States. Rather, in developed countries living kidney 
donors have generally reported excellent long-term health.96 A study 
conducted in Norway concluded that the risk to the donor is considered small, 
and in general, the donation outcome is excellent.97 
In addition, there are other financial considerations, such as medical 
bills, and time away from work, that the donor should consider when making 
the decision to donate. A potential donor can incur medical bills up to $5,000 
per kidney donation, as well as up to 6 weeks away from work.98 Further, 
there are other less tangible considerations, including maintaining life, 
disability, or medical insurance coverage after the donation.99 The argument 
that potential donors will not consider these unabsorbed costs is unfounded. 
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Rather, it is these additional costs that can actually discourage “altruistic” 
organ donation. If there was a way to cover these additional costs through a 
payment to the organ donor, there could potentially be an exponential 
increase in organ donation. As the system currently stands, only those who 
can afford the medical bills and the time away from work can “afford” to 
donate an organ. “We have created a model where only the rich can 
donate.”100 Rather than considering them a bar to an open market, these 
financial considerations should instead be considered as reasons to advocate 
for an open market. 
In comparison, when considering all of the variables, one study has 
suggested that the market price of a living donated kidney is around 
$15,200.101 This study considered three components: “a monetary 
compensation for the risk of death, a monetary compensation for the time lost 
during recovery, and a monetary compensation for the risk of reduced quality 
of life.”102 The $15,200 market price is nominal when compared to the cost 
of a typical transplant surgery, which costs $160,000 on average.103 
Furthermore, the average cost of dialysis for a period of one year in the 
United States is $89,000.104 Since living donors are already an important 
source of kidneys (approximately 33% of donated kidneys), allowing for the 
payment for kidneys should increase the supply, assuming donors respond to 
the financial incentive.105 Every individual is going to make his or her own 
cost-benefit analysis, but the relatively small payment of $15,200 for the 
organ donation would allow the organ donor to factor that payment into the 
benefit side of the equation. 
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C. An Organ Market Is Likely to Involve Corruption 
Another argument is that an open organ market will likely facilitate 
corruption and encourage donors to be less than truthful about their medical 
health and/or compatibility. Further, some experts theorize that once a price 
is put on the value of an organ, those with the economic means to pay will 
benefit, while those who cannot will be unable to afford the lifesaving 
transplant. This argument is reinforced by the reports of corruption in the 
Indian black market, where on average, the donor is promised one third more 
than they are actually paid after the donation.106 However, the legal system 
in the United States is more robust and effective than the legal system in 
India. The United States is better positioned to respond to any corruption and 
resolve these issues. In addition, the United States’ medical system is better 
equipped to screen potential donors and ensure that only healthy donors are 
considered for the market. 
Further, because black-market selling of organs is already occurring in 
the United States, this concern will exist regardless of the availability of 
legally-purchased organs. In the case of Levy Rosenbaum, who pled guilty 
to illegal organ trafficking, it was estimated that over the course of 10 years 
he bought organs from Israeli donors for as little as $10,000, and would sell 
them to Americans for more than $100,000 per kidney.107 The Rosenbaum 
case shows that when a black market is created, illegal suppliers will attempt 
to meet the demand. This allows for unscrupulous characters to prey upon 
innocent donors and exploit desperate recipients. By not allowing for a free 
market for the sale of organs, with the accompanying regulation, this type of 
corruption will flourish. 
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X. ADDITIONAL TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO THE ECONOMY 
There are two additional benefits to the economy that would result from 
a regulated organ market. First, organ recipients will experience a resulting 
increase in economic efficiency. An average patient in need of a kidney 
transplant spends about three to five years on the waitlist.108 During this time, 
patients typically go to dialysis 3 times per week at the average cost of $230 
per session.109 This results in an average cost of over $100,000 for the 3 years 
they spend on the waitlist.110 The majority of these costs are already borne 
by the taxpayer in the form of Medicare.111 In addition, decreased 
productivity occurs as a result of actual time spent getting dialysis. The 
average dialysis session lasts from three to five hours.112 Also, undergoing 
dialysis decreases a patient’s mobility and negatively affects the workplace, 
family and friends. All of these components reflect economic inefficiency 
resulting from the inability of supply to meet demand. 
Second, an open market could exist in addition to the current waitlist 
and national registry.113 If one accepts the hypothesis that the current 
donations are prompted by a sense of altruism, nothing suggests that this will 
change with the addition of an open organ market. There will still be cadaver 
kidney donations and an accompanying waitlist. An open market would only 
be in addition to those transplants that are already occurring. This benefits 
both those that can avail themselves of the open market and the other 
individuals that are also on the registry that are unable to afford to “purchase” 
a kidney. The number of individuals on the waitlist would decline, and there 
would be an increasing percentage of those getting transplants from that list. 
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XI. IRANIAN LIVING-UNRELATED DONOR PROGRAM 
In 1988, Iran adopted a compensated and regulated living-unrelated 
donor renal transplant program. The program has proven to be quite 
successful. By 1999, the renal transplant waiting list in the country was 
eliminated because the program successfully addressed the shortage of 
organs.114 The new economic system is highly regulated by the government. 
In the Iranian model, during transplant evaluation, the physician recommends 
and emphasizes the advantages of a living-related donor and discusses the 
shortage of cadaver kidneys.115 If no living-related donor exists, the patient 
is referred to the Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (hereinafter 
“DAPTA”) to locate a suitable living-unrelated donor.116 There is no role for 
a broker or agency for the organs in the system, and all of the renal transplant 
teams belong to university hospitals. Further, the government pays for all 
hospital expenses associated with the transplant and provides the donor with 
a monetary reward and health insurance. Most donors also receive a “gift” 
from the recipient, or from a charity if the recipient cannot afford a “gift.” 
Finally, the renal transplant teams do not receive any additional 
compensation or incentives from the recipient or the government. The current 
compensation to the donor is the equivalent of $4,500.117 The Iranian Society 
for Organ Transplantation enforces these strict policies and regulations and 
rules on any ethical issues. 
The Iranian model has provided interesting statistical results. First, there 
has been a reduction in living-related organ donation. Before 1988, almost 
all transplants were from living-related donors.118 In 2005, only 12% of all 
transplants were from living-related donors.119 This decrease in living-related 
donors might suggest that when there is a price to be collected for a kidney, 
the altruistic impulse to help a related recipient is reduced. Alternatively, an 
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open market for kidneys might have decreased coercive living-related 
transplants. In other words, family members are no longer required to 
pressure their relatives in order to procure a donation. Further, although Iran 
has allowed deceased-donor organ donation since 2000, only 12% of kidneys 
being transplanted are from deceased donors, compared to the 80% in the 
United States.120 Again, this statistic might show that due to the robust market 
for kidneys in Iran, there is a decreased need for deceased-donor organs. 
Conversely, this could also suggest that there is a lessened impulse to donate 
deceased-donor organs since there are alternative methods to procure a 
kidney through the government program. 
Some of the Iranian program’s guidelines have attempted to counter the 
public policy arguments that are leveraged against a living organ trade. For 
instance, in Iran there are provisions to provide free health insurance for the 
donor for a year following the procedure, thereby reducing the potential for 
residual health effects on the donors. In addition, if an Iranian recipient is 
unable to pay the cost of the transplant, they are not turned away. Instead, 
charitable organizations bridge the gap for those individuals who are unable 
to afford to pay for their transplant.121 This attempts to counter the notion that 
if the donors are being paid for their organs, that the recipient who is in 
poverty will be unable to secure a transplanted organ. 
Finally, in Iran, the data does not support the notion that if there is a 
market for organs, then kidney donors will be disproportionally poor and 
illiterate, while the recipients are educated and wealthy. The data show a 
more distributed donor and recipient base, with 84% of paid kidney donors 
labeled as “poor,” while recipients were classified as 50.4% “poor,” 36.2% 
“middle class,” and 13.4% “rich.”122 As a result, the data supports that more 
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than 50% of kidneys from paid donors are being transplanted into recipients 
labeled as “poor.” 
XII. PROPOSED LIVING KIDNEY VENDOR PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Although this article advocates for a living kidney vendor program in 
the United States, there is not a resulting need for the complete dismantling 
of NOTA. Rather, a living donor market for kidneys should be created with 
specific limitations in order to minimize corruptions and exploitation. Some 
of the principles of the Iranian model could be adopted in the United States, 
and result in a sustainable market for organs. There are three primary 
regulatory provisions that would limit the potential for abuse and exploitation 
of the system: government regulation for the price of a kidney, minimum age 
and health screening for donors, and a government agency managing the 
purchasing and distribution of the purchased kidneys. 
A. Government Regulated Price of a Kidney 
Similar to the Iranian model, there should be a set price for the value of 
a kidney. This would be a non-negotiable price set and paid by the 
government. By placing bounds on the price of a kidney, this will protect all 
parties from being exploited. In addition, the government can adjust the price 
relative to the costs imposed on the donors, rather than allowing the market 
to determine a fair price. This proposal is more akin to a government-
subsidized price than rather allowing the free market to determine the price 
based on supply and demand. However, the government can adjust the price 
based upon the supply as well. In the initial stages of the program, where 
there is a need to clear the remaining patients from the waitlist, the price 
could be set significantly higher to encourage additional supply. After 
equilibrium between supply and demand is reached, the price could be set 
closer to the free market price. Further, there would ultimately be a societal 
savings from the lower costs of long-term medical treatment recipients, 
including dialysis. Since the costs of this long-term treatment would be 
primarily paid for through government-subsidized programs, this would 
result in additional economic efficiency. 
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B. Minimum Age for Donors 
In addition, there would need to be a minimum age of 30 years in order 
to qualify to become a kidney donor. There are two reasons for this minimum 
age. First, the age requirement would reduce the temptation to donate without 
fully understanding the ramifications. A young adult between the ages of 18–
25 may not fully appreciate the risks associated with organ donation, and 
instead look only to the monetary benefit. In addition, there may be a 
tendency to pressure women and children into donating their organs. By 
requiring a minimum age of 30, the government can minimize the 
encouragement of individuals that are still under the coercive pressure of 
parents and other family members. This will reduce the exploitation of those 
that are unable to appreciate the long-term ramifications of their market 
decision, and/or those that are pressured into ignoring those ramifications. In 
addition, it would be necessary to enact comprehensive health screening, 
including a significant family disease profile. This would allow the ability to 
screen out those individuals with less than ideal medical conditions and 
ensure that long-term health effects are reduced. In the current system, there 
is a temptation, when considering recipient suffering, coupled with the 
determination of less than ideal living-related donor, to approve the surgery 
even in challenging circumstances. By removing this temptation through the 
increased supply of living-unrelated donors, the overall health of organ 
donors could actually increase. Further, the government has a financial 
interest in identifying potential donors that will result in the minimum 
amount of short-term and long-term health effects, and is therefore perfectly 
situated to make those screening decisions. 
C. Government Control over Purchase and Distribution of Kidneys 
The government should be the sole purchaser and distributor of the 
kidneys. Eliminating any “broker” or “agency” that has an economic 
incentive in recruiting or otherwise finding suitable donors reduces the 
potential for exploitation. This would also provide a convenient intermediary 
between organ donors and recipients, thereby reducing any potential conflicts 
of interest and/or additional payments or “gifts” that could be exploited from 
recipients. Lastly, the purchased kidneys should be allocated based on need, 
much like the current deceased donor program. The current system in the 
United States for the identification and distribution of deceased donor organs 
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would allow for a parallel system to identify and distribute purchased donor 
organs. 
XIII. CONCLUSION 
It has been more than 30 years since the passage of NOTA, and the time 
has come to repeal some of its provisions. A strong argument exists that 
enabling the “payment” for organ donation, specifically kidneys, would not 
only eliminate organ shortage, but also result in a more economically- 
efficient outcome. It is time to encourage a modified free market for living 
kidney donation, provided there are specific government regulations to 
reduce exploitation and the potential for abuse. 
